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Abstract. - In a community-structured population, public goods games (PGG) occur both within
and between communities. Such type of PGG is referred as multilevel public goods games
(MPGG). We propose a minimalist evolutionary model of the MPGG and analytically study
the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that in the case of sufficiently large community size
and community number, if the imitation strength within community is weak, i.e., an individual
imitates another one in the same community almost randomly, cooperation as well as punishment
are more abundant than defection in the long run; if the imitation strength between communities
is strong, i.e., the more successful strategy in two individuals from distinct communities is always
imitated, cooperation and punishment are also more abundant. However, when both of the two
imitation intensities are strong, defection becomes the most abundant strategy in the population.
Our model provides insight into the investigation of the large-scale cooperation in public social
dilemma among contemporary communities.
Introduction. – How cooperation emerges and pre-
vails in a selfish population poses a challenging problem in
evolutionary biology as well as behavioral science [1,2]. A
powerful paradigm for investigating this problem in groups
of interacting players of arbitrary size is public goods game
(PGG) [3, 4]. In a PGG, each cooperator invests into a
common pool while each defector attempts to exploit the
public goods without any contributions. Thus, the payoff
of a cooperator is always less than that of a defector. It is
better off defecting than cooperating.
During the past few years, a number of mechanisms
have been demonstrated analytically or experimentally to
promote cooperation [3–11]. As an important mechanism,
how spatial structure affects the evolution of cooperation
has attracted much attention recently [12–14]. In struc-
tured populations, cooperators may form clusters to re-
sist exploitation by defectors, resulting in the maintenance
of cooperation. So far, most previous works of PGG in
structured populations are based on lattice, small-world
networks and scale-free networks. However, the study of
(a)E-mail: wj02@pku.edu.cn
PGG in populations with community structure, which is
a signature of the hierarchical nature of real social and
biological systems [15, 16], has received little attention.
The so-called community structure consists of many
groups, where interaction rate within group is higher than
that between groups [15,16]. Due to the community struc-
ture, it is straightforward to consider that games are not
only played among community members, but also played
among different communities. Each individual engages in
not only the “local” PGG in its community, but also the
“global” PGG played among distinct communities. Hence,
individuals are simultaneously involved in multiple PGGs
on different hierarchical levels [17–19]. These simulta-
neous local and global PGGs in a community-structured
population constitute a multilevel PGG (MPGG).
Based on the MPGG, several straightforward questions
arise: How to maintain cooperation in a large-scale among
multiple communities? What is the effect of community
structures on the evolution of cooperation? Some re-
cent works have investigated the large-scale cooperation
in PGG among contemporary societies by behavioral ex-
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Fig. 1: (Color online) Sketch map of MPGG. On the first
level, in each G1-community, five individuals play a PGG to-
gether; On the second level, in each G2-community, three G1-
communities are involved in a larger PGG; On the third level,
two G2-communities take part in the largest PGG.
periments [17–19] and simulation [20]. Some theoretical
models are proposed to study the cooperation and pun-
ishment in infinite group-structured populations by deter-
ministic analysis [21]. However, finite population size is
proved to bring internal noise which drives the population
dynamics off the deterministic trajectory in the infinite
situations [22, 23]. Thus, a mathematical model of how
community structures affect the evolution of cooperation
in finite populations is still lacking.
Motivated by these, we propose a minimalist evolution-
ary model of MPGG and analytically study the evolution
of cooperation in finite populations with such commu-
nity structures where the interaction within community
is far more frequent than that between communities. We
adopt imitation updating rule and explore how the imi-
tation strength within community and that between com-
munities influence the evolutionary of cooperation. We
demonstrate that under the condition of sufficiently large
community size and community number, if the imitation
strength within community is weak, or that between com-
munities is strong, cooperation can prevail in the popula-
tion. Nevertheless, if both of the imitation strengths are
strong, defection is the unique favorable strategy. Further-
more, when the imitation within community is moderate,
small imitation between communities may favor punishers
prevailing while cooperators nearly disappear.
Model. – Consider a finite population with commu-
nity structures in which individuals take part in an n-
level PGG. In this population, every m1 individuals form
a community, and any two such communities have no com-
mon member. Denote this type of communities by G1.
Moreover, every m2 G1-communities constitute a larger
community denoted by G2. This similar formation pro-
cess repeats until mn Gn−1-communities make up a Gn-
community which is the entire population. According to
the above formation rule, this population is characterized
by a hierarchical structure (see fig. 1).
We first study the simplest case with only two strate-
gies: cooperation and defection (the case with punishment
will be added and described later). A MPGG is played as
follows: on the first level, in each G1-community, m1 indi-
viduals play a PGG together. Each cooperator contributes
c into the public pool in the G1-community to which this
player belongs, and every defector donates nothing. The
total amount in this public pool is separated into two
parts: one portion, whose proportion is k1, is allocated
to the local PGG in this G1-community, and the other
portion, whose proportion is 1 − k1, is contributed into a
higher public pool in the larger G2-community which con-
tains this G1-community. The total contribution in this
local PGG is multiplied by an enhancement factor r1, and
the product is distributed equally among all players in this
G1-community no matter whether they contribute or not.
On the second level, in each G2-community, m2 G1-
communities engage in a larger PGG. Each G1-community
contributes a fraction of the total amount (the proportion
is 1− k1), which is collected in the PGG among its mem-
bers, into the public pool in G2-community which contains
this G1-community. Then, the total amount in this public
pool in G2-community is also divided into two parts: one
part whose proportion is k2 is contributed to the PGG in
this G2-community and the other part is submitted to the
higher public pool in the G3-community on the third level.
The first part is multiplied by an enhancement factor r2,
and the product is distributed among all individuals in
this G2-community.
Such type of PGG repeats until the highest level. On
the highest level, the total amount in the public pool
in Gn-community is contributed into the global PGG.
This amount is multiplied by an enhancement factor rn,
then the product is distributed among the entire popu-
lation. Although cooperators only contribute in the G1-
community on the lowest level, their contributions are al-
located in n different PGGs at hierarchical levels. The
payoff of each individual, irrespective of cooperators and
defectors, is derived from n PGGs.
Individuals in the population adjust their strategies
through imitation. At each time step, two players i and
j are randomly chosen. These two players belong to the
same G1-community with the interaction rate q1. The
probability that individual i adopts the strategy of j is
given by 1/{1+exp[−w1(Fj−Fi)]}, where w1 ≥ 0 denotes
the imitation strength between two players in the sameG1-
community, Fi and Fj are the payoff of individual i and
j [7]. The imitation strength measures the dependence of
decision making on the payoff comparison. For w1 → 0,
individual i imitates the strategy of j almost randomly,
which is referred as “weak imitation”. For w1 → ∞, a
more successful player is always imitated, which is referred
as “strong imitation”.
Moreover, if the two players do not belong to the
same G1-community, but they are part of the same G2-
community, the interaction rate for these two players is
q2. In this case, player i imitates the strategy of j with
the probability 1/{1+exp[−w2(Fj−Fi)]}, where w2 is the
imitation strength between two players from different G1-
p-2
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Fig. 2: (Color online) Fixation process of a single mutant in
a population. (a) A single mutant is produced in the popula-
tion; (b) This mutant successfully takes over its G1-community,
and another individual from other G1-communities imitates
the mutant’s strategy; (c) The mutant successfully invades its
G2-community, and another one from other G2-communities
imitates the strategy of the mutant. This type of fixation and
imitation repeat until the population full of one type of players.
communities but in the same G2-community. In general,
the interaction rate for two players belonging to different
Gl-communities (l = 1, · · · , n − 1) but in the same Gl+1-
community is ql+1. The relationship
∑n
l=1 ql = 1 needs
to be satisfied. In this case, player i changes its strategy
to j’s with the probability 1/{1 + exp[−wl+1(Fj − Fi)]}
(l = 1, · · · , n − 1), where wl+1 denotes the imitation
strength between two Gl-communities. Since we focus on
such community structure where the interaction within
community is far more frequent than that between com-
munities, we assume q1 ≫ q2 ≫ · · · ≫ qn.
For finite populations, we analyze the advantage of a
strategy through fixation probability, which measures the
probability for a single mutant using such focal strategy
to successfully take over the resident population. In or-
der to obtain a general expression, we suppose there are
two types of strategies, A and B. Imagine that a mu-
tant adopting strategy A is produced in a population of
B players. Since q1 ≫ q2, the time that this mutant
takes over the G1-community to which it belongs or dis-
appears is shorter than that two individuals from different
G1 communities meet. The time scales of fixation in a G1-
community and imitation between two individuals from
different G1-communities are separated. Thus, fixation
of this mutant A in the population goes through several
stages described by fig. 2.
Actually, the fixation process of a single A mutant in
a population is equivalent to only n steps: the fixation
of this A mutant in its G1-community; The fixation of
this G1-community composed entirely of A players in its
G2-community;...; The fixation of the Gn−1-community
invaded by the A mutant in the whole population.
Denote the fixation probability of a single A mutant in-
vading aG1-community ofB players by ρ
1
BA. This fixation
probability ρ1BA equals
ρ1BA=
1
1+
∑m1−1
j=1 exp{w1
∑j
i=1[F
1
B(m1 − i)− F
1
A(i)]}
, (1)
where F 1A(i) and F
1
B(m1−i) are the payoff of each A player
and each B player in the focalG1-community, respectively,
when there are i A players and m1 − i B players in this
G1-community [24].
Denote the fixation probability of a G1-community full
of A players in its G2-community of only B individuals
by ρ2BA. Suppose there are i G1-communities consisting
of only A players and m2 − i G1-communities of only B
players. In this focal G2-community, the payoff of each
A player is denoted by F 2A(i) and that of each B player
is F 2B(m2 − i). A new G1-community full of A players
arises when two players with different strategies from dif-
ferent G1-communities are chosen, and the B player alters
its strategy through imitation, then it takes over its G1-
community. Thus, the probability to increase the number
of G1-communities full of A players by one is given by
Γ+A(i) = q2
i
m2
m2 − i
m2
ρ1BA
1 + exp{−w2[F 2A(i)− F
2
B(m2 − i)]}
.
Similarly, the probability to decrease the number of G1-
communities full of A players by one is
Γ−A(i) = q2
i
m2
m2 − i
m2
ρ1AB
1 + exp{−w2[F 2B(m2 − i)− F
2
A(i)]}
.
The fixation probability of a G1-community full of A
players in a G2-community is obtained as follows
ρ2BA=
1
1+
∑m2−1
j=1 exp{w2
∑j
i=1[F
2
B(m2−i)−F
2
A(i)]}(ρ
1
AB/ρ
1
BA)
j
.
In general, denote the fixation probability of a single A
mutant in a Gl-community consisting of only B players
(l = 2, · · · , n) by ΦlBA. Accordingly, we have
ΦlBA = ρ
1
BA × ρ
2
BA × · · · × ρ
l
BA, (2)
where
ρlBA=
1
1+
∑ml−1
j=1 exp{wl
∑j
i=1[F
l
B(ml−i)−F
l
A(i)]}(ρ
l−1
AB/ρ
l−1
BA)
j
.
Two-level PGG with punishment. – We now con-
sider two-level PGG. Suppose three available strategies in
this PGG: cooperation, defection and punishment. Pun-
ishers are such type of players which contribute as coop-
erators but reduce the payoff of defectors with a cost to
themselves. We focus on the situation without second-
order punishment which does not punish cooperators [7].
In each G1-community, punishment acts as a personal
behavior. Its object is defectors. Each punisher imposes a
fine β1 on each defector at a cost γ1 (γ1 < β1) to itself. The
total fine for a defector relies on the number of punishers in
this G1-community, whereas the total cost for a punisher
is determined by the number of defectors.
Furthermore, for the separation of time scales, commu-
nities always stay in homogeneous states. If a homoge-
neous community is composed of punishers, they act as
an institute of punishment. This institute of punishment
punishes those communities consisting of defectors even
p-3
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also containing cooperators or punishers since such com-
munities free-ride on the global public goods. Specifically,
a community full of punishers punishes those communities
where defectors exist. Each punishing community reduces
the total payoff of each punished community by m1β2, at
a total cost m1γ2 (γ2 < β2). Then, the cost of punishing
is shared by all punishers in this punishing community,
whereas the fine on the punished community is distributed
among its members. Hence, the total fine for each individ-
ual in the punished communities depends on the number
of the punishing communities, while the total cost for each
punisher in the punishing communities is determined by
the number of the punished communities.
Although the strategy updating is mainly dependent on
imitation, mutation of strategies may happen sometimes.
At each time step, every individual may mistakenly switch
its strategy to a different and random strategy with the
probability µ. Suppose the mutation rate µ → 0. Suf-
ficiently small µ assures that a single mutant vanishes or
fixes in a population before the next mutant appears. The
population is homogeneous most of the time [5, 24, 25].
Therefore, in the limit of rare mutations, the evolutionary
process of consideration can be approximated by a Markov
chain where the state space is composed of homogeneous
states full of each type of players. In this case, the state
space of this Markov chain contains homogeneous state of
cooperators, that of defectors and that of punishers. The
corresponding transition probability matrix is
Λ=


1−ΦnCD−Φ
n
CP Φ
n
CD Φ
n
CP
ΦnDC 1−Φ
n
DC−Φ
n
DP Φ
n
DP
ΦnPC Φ
n
PD 1−Φ
n
PC−Φ
n
PD

 . (3)
The normalized left eigenvector corresponding to the
eigenvalue 1 of the matrix Λ determines the stationary
distribution, which describes in the long run, the percent-
age of time spent by the population in each homogeneous
state. The stationary distribution for the above transition
matrix eq. (3) can be calculated as follows
XC =
ΦnPCΦ
n
DP +Φ
n
PCΦ
n
DC +Φ
n
DCΦ
n
PD
∆
XD =
ΦnPCΦ
n
CD +Φ
n
CDΦ
n
PD +Φ
n
CPΦ
n
PD
∆
XP =
ΦnCPΦ
n
DC +Φ
n
CDΦ
n
DP +Φ
n
CPΦ
n
DP
∆
, (4)
where XC , XD, and XP denote the probability to find the
population in the homogeneous state consisting entirely
of cooperators, defectors, and punishers, respectively, the
normalization factor ∆ insures XC +XD +XP = 1.
We only discuss the situation of a two-level PGG in
detail. In the case of no defectors, since punishers do as
the same as cooperators under the condition of no second-
order punishment, these two types of players are of no
difference. This situation can be viewed as “neutral case”,
where the fixation probability of a neutral mutant equals
the reciprocal of the population size [26], that is, Φ2CP =
1/(m1m2) and Φ
2
PC = 1/(m1m2).
The fixation probabilities Φ2DC , Φ
2
CD, Φ
2
DP and Φ
2
PD
are given as follows:
Φ2DP=ρ
1
DP × ρ
2
DP
1
ρ2DP
=1+
m2−1∑
j=1
exp{w2
j∑
i=1
[c+γ2m2−ck1r1−(β2+γ2)i]}×(
ρ1PD
ρ1DP
)j ,
Φ2DC =
1
1 +
∑m2−1
j=1 exp(Θj)
×
1
1 +
∑m1−1
j=1 exp(w1cj)
,
Φ2CD =
1
1 +
∑m2−1
j=1 exp(−Θj)
×
1
1 +
∑m1−1
j=1 exp(−w1cj)
,
Φ2PD=ρ
1
PD × ρ
2
PD
ρ1PD=
1
1 +
∑m1−1
j=1 exp{w1
∑j
i=1[(m1 − i)β1 − c− iγ1]}
1
ρ2PD
=1+
m2−1∑
j=1
exp{w2
j∑
i=1
[ck1r1+β2m2−c−(β2+γ2)i]}×(
ρ1DP
ρ1PD
)j .
where Θ = c[w2(1− k1r1) + w1(m1 − 1)].
Note that when w1 → 0 and w2 is not weak, the relation-
ship Φ2CD <
1
m1m2
< Φ2DC is always satisfied in the case
of k1r1 > 1. Besides, when w2 → ∞ and w1 is limited,
there is Φ2DC > Φ
2
CD in the case of k1r1 > 1. It indicates
that in these two situations, cooperation is more abun-
dant than defection [27]. Except for these two conditions,
defection is always more abundant than cooperation. In
addition, when m1γ1 ≫ c and m1β1 ≫ c, the inequal-
ity Φ1DP > Φ
1
PD is always satisfied. Furthermore, when
m2γ2 ≫ c − ck1r1 and m2β2 ≫ ck1r1 − c, the relation-
ship ρ2DP > ρ
2
PD always holds, regardless of the imitation
strengths w1 and w2. Hence, if m1 and m2 are sufficiently
large, punishers are always more abundant than defectors.
Based on the stationary distribution, we find that
when m1 and m2 are sufficiently large, weak imitation
within G1-community or strong imitation between G1-
communities is of great benefit to cooperators and pun-
ishers (see fig. 3). In these two cases, cooperators do as
well as punishers, they are both more abundant than de-
fectors. However, if these two imitation strengths are both
strong, it is harmful to the evolution of cooperation and
punishment. Moreover, in the case of moderate imitation
strength w1, small w2 may favor punishers prevailing but
has a little effect on the emergence of cooperation (see
fig. 4(a)). Furthermore, when w2 is moderate, the preser-
vation of cooperators and punishers are hindered. When
w2 is large enough, cooperation and punishment are still
more abundant than defection.
The reason for the above phenomenon is that under the
condition k1r1 > 1, weak w1 incurs Φ
2
DC > Φ
2
CD, and the
inequality Φ2DP > Φ
2
PD always holds for sufficiently large
m1 and m2. Based on eq. (4), we obtain XC > XD and
XP > XD for weak w1. In this case, the population spends
p-4
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Fig. 3: (Color online) Stationary distribution as functions of
imitation strengths w1 and w2. (a) Probability XC ; (b) Prob-
ability XP . Probability XD can be derived from XC +XD +
XP = 1. Weak w1 or strong w2 is favorable for the prevalence
of cooperators as well as punishers. However, if both imitation
strengths are strong, it is harmful to the emergence of cooper-
ation and punishment. Parameters: c = 0.8, k1 = 0.5, r1 = 3,
β1 = 1, γ1 = 0.5, β2 = 1, γ2 = 0.5, m1 = 20, and m2 = 20.
most time in homogeneous state of cooperators or punish-
ers. We state that our below results are all based on the
assumption of sufficiently largem1 andm2. Note that k1r1
denotes effective enhancement factor within community.
Only when the effective enhancement factor larger than
one, cooperation may be favored in the long run. This
condition k1r1 > 1 is consistent with that in [3]. More-
over, when w1 is moderate (w1 = 0.1 in fig. 4(a)), small
w2 leads to the inequality Φ
2
DC < Φ
2
CD. However, there is
always Φ2DP > Φ
2
PD. It indicates that defectors are more
abundant than cooperators while punishers are superior
to defectors. Note that punishment and cooperation are
equal. Which one is the most favorable strategy depends
on the comparison between Φ2CD and Φ
2
DP . Denote the
ratio Φ2CD/Φ
2
DP by K. From fig. 4(b), the rising K leads
to decreasingXP as well asXC , but increasingXD. When
the gap between Φ2CD and Φ
2
DP is sufficiently small, the
population spends its most time staying in the homoge-
neous state of punishers. With the increase in this gap,
the advantage of defection over cooperation is enhanced,
or that of punishment over defection is weakened. Con-
sequently, defectors become more and more frequent than
punishers and cooperators. However, when the imitation
strength w2 reaches so large that makes the inequality
Φ2DC > Φ
2
CD satisfied, defectors perform the worst, the
population is most likely to be found in the homogenous
state full of cooperators or punishers with nearly equal
probabilities.
Large imitation strength w2 can also be viewed as posi-
tive out-group attitude which shows preference for individ-
uals from other communities, while weak w2 can be seen
as neutral out-group attitude. From fig. 4(a), neutral out-
group attitude is of great benefit to punishment but harm-
ful to the evolution of cooperation. The impact of positive
out-group attitude on the evolution of punishment is com-
plicated. With an enhanced positive out-group attitude,
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Fig. 4: (Color online) (a) Stationary distribution as a function
of imitation strength w2 in the case of moderate w1 (= 0.1).
Strong w2 makes cooperators and punishers more abundant
than defectors. Besides, small w2 also promotes punishment
to be the most abundant strategy. However, moderate w2 is
harmful to both cooperators and punishers. (b) The ratio be-
tween Φ2CD and Φ
2
DP as a function of imitation strength w2
when w1 = 0.1 in the case of Φ
2
DC < Φ
2
CD . The ratio K sus-
tainedly rises. It leads to the decrease of XP as well as XC
and the increase of XD when Φ
2
DC < Φ
2
CD. Parameters in
these two figures are the same as those in fig. 3.
punishment is favored at first, then its amount shrinks and
rises finally. When the preference of individuals for those
in other communities is sufficiently large, cooperation is
also greatly favored.
Discussions and Conclusions. – we have proposed
a minimalist theoretical model of MPGG in finite pop-
ulations with community structures and explored under
what circumstances the assortment of cooperation can be
achieved in community-structured populations. We found
that if the community size and the community number
are both sufficiently large, weak imitation within commu-
nity or strong imitation between communities promotes
the prevalence of cooperation. This can be attributed to
the principle that weak imitation within community may
lead to assortment of cooperators, while strong imitation
between communities assures the prevalence of coopera-
tive behavior once a cluster of cooperators appears. How-
ever, if the imitation strengths within and between com-
munities both become strong, cooperation as well as pun-
ishment are eliminated from the population. In addition,
it is interesting that when the imitation within community
is moderate, small imitation between communities makes
punishers extraordinarily abundant in the population but
cooperators nearly disappear.
A model relevant to ours is from ref. [28], where Traulsen
and Nowak studied the effect of multilevel selection on the
evolution of cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a
classic two-person game. Compared with this model, we
focus on PGG, a multi-person game, which has different
ingredients and background from PD. Moreover, in [28],
the game only occurs in each group, and there is no inter-
action between any two individuals from different groups.
However, in our model, game exists not only in each com-
p-5
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munity but among different communities. Besides, inter-
actions always happen between individuals from distinct
communities. It incurs the prevalence of a strategy across
community. For the strategy updating rule, Moran pro-
cess is applied in [28] while we adopted imitation process.
Although the approximate expressions of fixation proba-
bility in these two different processes in the limit of weak
selection are almost identical [29], those in the case of a
moderate selection are extraordinarily different from each
other. In addition, according to the evolution process, we
obtain the essential difference between the model in [28]
and ours as the mechanism to promote cooperation: the
former is group selection whereas the latter is spatial se-
lection. Group selection is suitable for the situation where
individuals compete within groups and groups also com-
pete with each other; Spatial selection is valid when there
is only assortment of cooperators and no group level of se-
lection [30]. In our model, there is no competition among
communities and no selection at group level. Thus, this is
not group selection but spatial selection.
Another similar concept to the community-structured
population in biology is metapopulation [31]. Although
both metapopulation and the community-structured pop-
ulation can be viewed as group-structured population, the
mechanisms for the evolution of populations in these two
types of models are different. The evolution of species
in metapopulation is driven by recolonization and extinc-
tion, i.e., birth and death process in biology, while the
evolution of cooperation in our work is inspired by imi-
tation which is a behavior in sociology. In addition, we
consider a simple type of punishment in this paper, which
solely punishes defectors. In this case, cooperators become
second-order free-riders since they exploit the sacrifice of
punishers. Thus, cooperation should also be punished.
Sigmund et al. shew that incorporating second-order pun-
ishment, which punishes both defectors and cooperators,
the evolutionary dynamics can be drastically altered [7].
Besides, amount of empirical evidences reveal that defec-
tors sometimes punish cooperators [32]. The correspond-
ing population dynamics can be qualitatively changed by
this “anti-social punishment” [33]. Therefore, to explore
the effects of second-order punishment and antisocial pun-
ishment on the evolution of cooperation deserves more at-
tention in future studies.
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